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Introduction
In August of 2021, water levels in Lake Mead hovered at 1067ft. At just 35% of its
capacity, Lake Mead was at its lowest level since it was created through the building of the
Hoover Dam in 1931. This is the culmination of the Colorado River basin experiencing its driest
22-year period recorded in over 100 years (Udall & Overpeck, 2017). This megadrought has
coincided with a population boom in the U.S. Southwest with cities like Phoenix, which has
grown by a rate of 11.2% in the past 10 years, creating exponential increases in the demand for
freshwater. Unfortunately, drought conditions will continue to persist due to the effects of climate
change on the Colorado River’s hydrological system. A recent article published in Science
predicts the Colorado River’s flow will decrease by 9.3% per degree Celsius of warming due to
decreasing snowpack in the Rocky Mountains (Milly & Dunne, 2020). The increasing stress on
the Colorado River due to climate change, increasing population growth, and a legacy of
overallocation has resulted in the rapid depletion of water levels in Lake Mead, threatening the
water supply of 40 million people.
In reaction to Lake Mead’s rapid depletion, representatives from the seven basin states of
the Colorado Compact, California, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, and
Utah, as well as Mexico, signed a set of agreements to address the issues caused by drought, the
2007 Interim Guidelines and the 2019 Drought Contingency Plan (DCP). These agreements
intended to provide a temporary plan consisting of a series of voluntary reductions and increased
conservation to address water shortage conditions. As agreed upon by the seven basin states in
the DCP, the first of these voluntary reductions will be triggered when Lake Mead dips below an
elevation of 1,090 ft. With Lake Mead currently hovering at 1,067ft, both Nevada and Arizona
will be instituting cuts in their allocation from the Colorado River in 2022. This means that
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Arizona will lose 192,000 acre-feet of its 2.8 million acre-feet allocation, enough water to cover
192,000 football fields in a foot of water and supply 384,000 households with water for a year
(Bureau of Reclamation, 2019).
However, the agreements in place do not provide a long-term plan for managing the
Colorado River under the increasing pressures of climate change and population growth. The
2007 Interim Guidelines were enacted in response to persistent drought conditions affecting the
flow of the Colorado River and water levels in Lake Mead. The guidelines dictated that if Lake
Mead dipped below 1075 ft, the Bureau of Reclamation would declare a shortage and states
would face cuts to their water allocations. In 2016, a shortage was narrowly avoided, causing
states to realize the Interim Guidelines were too ambiguous in their plan for implementing cuts to
water in the case of a shortage. Therefore, the seven basin states reconvened and created the DCP
in 2019. The DCP defined the exact amount of water that would be withheld from each state
based on the level of water in Lake Mead, with the first cuts being implemented when Lake
Mead dipped below 1090 ft. This clarified some of the ambiguity in operationalizing water cuts.
These agreements provide a plan to respond to emergency shortage conditions, but they do not
provide a framework for sustainably using the Colorado River to preserve it as a water source in
the coming decades.
In response to this challenge, the Bureau of Reclamation will draft a plan in 2026 for the
long-term management of the Colorado River. With forthcoming inter-state negotiations
looming, the Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR) organized the Arizona
Reconsultation Committee (ARC) to engage a variety of water users in a discussion to formulate
Arizona’s priorities. Since June of 2020, the Arizona Department of Water Resources has led
nearly 40 stakeholders (SHs) through a series of public meetings to discuss the state of the
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current agreement as well as discuss the concerns of SHs for the forthcoming interstate
negotiations (Person, 2020).
In an attempt to ensure equity in the SH engagement process, ADWR has invited local
politicians, private interests, municipal water professionals, and tribal authorities to provide their
perspectives on instituting further water cuts and preserving the Colorado River. However, the
extent to which ARC has created an inclusive SH engagement process that empowers the voices
of all participants has yet to be determined.
This matters, particularly to indigenous communities, because SH engagement has the
potential to uplift the voices of marginalized groups to create policies in which their concerns are
recognized and addressed. However, the SH engagement process is fraught with challenges and
often fails to meaningfully influence final policy decisions. Poorly structured SH engagement
can include barriers, often unintentionally, that restrict the access of marginalized groups to the
table, further empowering privileged voices and entrenching existing inequalities.
The Colorado River, being one of the most heavily regulated rivers in the world, has
witnessed a multitude of attempts by state agencies to include SHs in the formation and
implementation of regulations. Previous SH engagement initiatives attempted by Arizona and the
other basin states to regulate the Colorado River have failed to take into account how time and
financial constraints, poor communication about meeting times and location, unresolved
differences in cultural views towards natural resource management, and a legacy of distrust of
the state can potentially exclude SHs from the decision-making process (Karambelkar & Gerlak,
2020).
To analyze Arizona's SH engagement process in formulating the state’s response to
persistent drought conditions and water cuts, this senior project asks the following questions: to
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what extent have SHs been meaningfully consulted in the formation of the DCP and forthcoming
interstate drought agreements? How have power imbalances between SHs affected the inclusion
of all voices in the policy formulation process? In particular, how have indigenous communities
created coalitions with each other and other SHs, such as NGOs, to leverage their collective
voice and influence the drought planning process? Has water scarcity in the Southwest created a
window of opportunity for indigenous communities to draw attention to historical injustices in
water distribution, or will it further entrench current inequalities in water access?
To address these questions, this senior project analyzes the extent to which the state of
Arizona has attempted to develop a set of best practices to meaningfully engage SHs in the
creation and implementation of interstate drought agreements, and to what degree power
imbalances between SHs have restricted the inclusion of all voices in this process, further
exacerbating inequalities in water access. To do so, the project will draw from scholarship
discussing proposed frameworks for resource management such as integrated water resource
management (IWRM) and adaptive governance (AG), previous cases of SH engagement and
their best practices, and the literature on policy windows in facilitating governance shifts.
This project will examine two rounds of SH engagement to assess lessons learned
regarding gaps in inclusion. The first round this project will assess is the Steering Committee, a
SH engagement initiative overseen by the ADWR to discuss and implement the 2019 DCP. The
second round examines ARC which is currently holding sessions to inform Arizona’s position on
the forthcoming 2026 operating guidelines for the Colorado River. Treating these two processes
as cases, the project will use a mix of methods ranging from semi-structured and open-ended
interviews to construct a case analysis. These interviews will be used to gather information on
the experience of SHs represented in these processes and the attempts made by state agencies to
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create an inclusive environment for these SHs. In addition, this project will pull on primary
sources from the state of Arizona and secondary literature.
The project is structured as follows: Chapter one lays out the historical background of the
Colorado River basin and will discuss the development of the “Law of the River'' that governs
water use in the Colorado River basin. Chapter Two is a literature review to create an analytic
framework for understanding the case. This framework will draw on scholarship exploring best
practices for SH engagement, integrated water resource management, adaptive governance, and
policy windows. Chapter Three will introduce the case of SH engagement in Arizona, discussing
Arizona’s current SH engagement initiative, the ARC, as well as the Steering Committee which
concluded sessions after the DCP was implemented in 2019. Chapter Four is an analytical
conclusion that ties the framework I develop from the literature to the case.
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Chapter 1: The History of Governing the Colorado River
A complex series of state and national policies implemented throughout the past 100
years, referred to as the “Law of the River'', dictate the use of the Colorado River. These policies
have attempted to divide the river equitably and sustainably, but have left the Colorado River
overallocated and engendered competition between states over its use. This chapter will explore
the history of governing the Colorado River, and how this governance structure has contributed
to current shortages and influences policy-making in the Colorado River basin today. It will
begin by discussing the development of the prior appropriation doctrine, which defines water
rights in the US Southwest. It will continue to discuss important legislation and court cases such
as the Colorado River Compact and Arizona vs California. Finally, this chapter will briefly
introduce the recently passed 2007 Interim Guidelines and the 2019 Drought Contingency Plan.

The Prior Appropriation Doctrine: Water Rights in the US Southwest
The American Southwest ranges from semi-arid to arid regions. The average rainfall in
the Southwest ranges from 12 inches a year in Arizona to approximately 20 inches per year in
Colorado which, compared to the national average of 85 inches per year, demonstrates the aridity
of the region (Sheppard et al, 2002). The limited quantity of water available quickly caused
white settlers in the region to recognize that control over water rights was essential in
establishing settlements and stimulating growth. During the early period of white settlement, the
law of prior appropriation was developed as a model of structuring water rights unique from the
riparian laws established in the wetter, eastern parts of the country. As the need to transfer water
and irrigate farmland became a pressing issue in the Colorado territory in the 1860s, the territory
passed a series of laws referred to as the Colorado Doctrine (Schorr, 2012; Summit, 2013).
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Under the riparian water rights model, individuals owning property in proximity to
streams or other bodies of water had priority to use the water in those streams. However, in the
Southwest where bodies of water are few and far between, this model was ineffective in
providing water for the growing number of farmers looking to irrigate their land. Under the
model of prior appropriation, priority is given to individuals who were first to file a claim with
the state instead of priority being given to those owning property adjacent to a water source
(Schorr, 2013). In a climate where water is scarce, the drafters of the Colorado Doctrine
recognized the importance of ensuring water was being used efficiently. Therefore, the law of
prior appropriation also dictates that individuals can only be granted a claim to water if they can
put that water to a “beneficial use” (Schorr, 2013). This was intended to ensure that water users
would not make claims to more water than they would be able to utilize. The Colorado Doctrine
served as a model for other territories and later states, establishing a system of water rights based
on prior appropriation with its emphasis on temporal priority and beneficial use throughout the
Southwest.
The Colorado River Compact: Dividing the River
In the 1920s, California’s exponential population growth and increasing demand for
water caused concern among other states reliant on the Colorado River. In June of 1922, the
Supreme court ruled in the case Wyoming vs Colorado that the law of prior appropriation applies
regardless of state lines (Summit, 2013). At this time, California’s population greatly
outnumbered the other states in the Colorado River basin, meaning California could easily
establish control over the bulk of the available water and severely restrict the growth of the other
states. As a result, representatives from the basin states called for negotiations to create a more
equitable distribution of water between the basin states. From these negotiations, the states
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signed and ratified the 1922 Colorado River Compact. Within the compact, the Colorado River
System was defined as the whole portion of the Colorado River and its tributaries located within
the borders of the United States. The states through which the river flows were split into the
upper Colorado River basin and the lower Colorado River basin with the upper basin including
Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming, and Utah while the lower half includes California, Arizona,
and Nevada (Hundley Jr., 1975).
Image 1: The Upper and Lower Colorado River Basins
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Due to several abnormally wet years preceding the compact, the amount of water
available for anthropogenic use was severely overestimated. The compact delegated an equal
allocation of 7.5 million acre feet (maf) per year to each basin in order to ensure equity between
the lower and upper basins (Hundley Jr., 1975). This number was based on hydrologic data
collected by the Bureau of Reclamation that estimated the river's annual flow to be 16.4 maf .
However, the flow of the Colorado River is subject to severe fluctuations, and the data that
informed the Colorado River Compact was taken during a historically wet year. The overall
average stream flow since the Bureau of Reclamation began collecting data is approximately 15
maf. However, due to the megadrought the Southwest has been experiencing for the past two
decades, stream flow has been significantly lower, with the average flow over the past ten years
being 13.6 maf (US DOI, 2020). Therefore, there is a discrepancy of over 3 maf between the
stream flow data that informed the Colorado River Compact and the current ten year average.
This overallocation of the river is partially to blame for the current decreasing water levels in
Lake Mead and the increasing strain on the Colorado River.
Despite the attempt of the Colorado River Compact in the 1920s to create an equitable
system of water allotments between the seven basin states, tension remained, especially among
the Lower basin states. The compact only dictated the allocation between the upper and lower
basins without detailing how the water would be divided among the states within each basin
(Huxley Jr., 1975). This put Arizona at a disadvantage in the state's growing rivalry with
California. California, who had already made significant strides in developing and using water
from the Colorado River, had no set limit on the amount of water they could draw from the lower
basin’s 7.5 maf. Since California was rapidly developing and quickly putting water to “beneficial
use”, they were set to snatch up the bulk of the lower basins allotment, crowding out Arizona and
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stunting the state’s development (Poupeau, 2016). The Colorado Compact also failed to dictate
whether or not states would be given the water rights to the tributaries that flowed within their
borders. Arizona, home to the Colorado River’s largest tributary, refused to sign the compact as a
result of this ambiguity, and would not ratify it until 1944 (Summit, 2012). Therefore, the
Colorado Compact, although intending to create an equitable division of water between the
states, laid the groundwork for continued conflict among the lower basin states, specifically
Arizona and California.
In addition to the ambiguity over individual state allocations, the compact failed to
account for Native American reservations who collectively, due to the Winters Doctrine, had one
of the largest claims to the Colorado River. The Winters Doctrine dictated that when congress
created reserved land, they implicitly reserved enough water to satisfy all “current and future
demand”. The Winters Doctrine did not clarify how to calculate “current and future demand” nor
did it provide funding for Reservations to develop their reserved water (Brougher, 2011). The
Colorado Compact did little to settle these issues, with only one line included in the Compact
addressing indiginous claims to the river: “Nothing in this compact shall be construed as
affecting the obligations of the United States of America to Indian Tribes” (Huxley Jr., 1975). As
a result, many tribes in the Colorado River basin turned to litigation in order to secure the
allocation of water they were entitled to. Although they won many of these lawsuits, the
resulting decisions led to more water rights that were guaranteed on paper, but no tangible
infrastructure was built to deliver this water (Summit, 2012). This further perpetuated the federal
and state government’s delivery of “paper water” to Native American reservations without
actually creating any plans to deliver “wet water”.
Arizona vs California: Settling Disputes over the River
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In 1929, congress passed the Boulder Canyon Project Act that allowed for the
construction of the Boulder Canyon Dam, later renamed the Hoover Dam. The dam had the
potential to greatly increase California’s access to the Colorado River while simultaneously
diminishing the amount of water that would flow through Arizona, further intensifying the
tension within the lower basin (Summit, 2012). This sparked a legal battle between California
and Arizona that would last for over 3 decades. After a series of lawsuits filed by Arizona against
California, a decision was finally reached in 1964 by the Supreme court. Arizona vs California
(1964) gave the federal government, acting through the Secretary of the Interior, power to dictate
the amount of water allocated to each state within the upper and lower basins. California was
allotted 4.4 maf, with Arizona and Nevada receiving 2.6 maf and 300,000 acre feet (af)
respectively. The Secretary of the Interior was given the authority to institute cuts to each state's
allocation in the case of a shortage (Poupeau, 2016). Thus, as a result of continuous disagreement
between states, the Colorado River is governed both at the state level and on the federal level,
with the Department of the Interior retaining the power to enter into contracts with and facilitate
negotiations between states, set allocations, and declare cuts during water shortages.
The decision also ensured Native American reservations within the basin states would
receive enough water from the Colorado River to irrigate all the irrigable parts of their reserved
land, establishing the concept of practicable irrigable acreage (PIA). The concept of PIA allowed
reservations to claim not only all the water they could currently use, but also the water that
would potentially be needed after further development (Brougher, 2011). This provided a legal
basis for tribes to potentially expand their access to the Colorado River, while also further
entrenching indiginous water practices within the colonial governing regime (Curley, 2021). This
water would be charged to the apportionment of the state in which the reservation is located.
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Therefore, the water diverted from the Colorado River to Native American reservations within
Arizona count towards the state’s 2.4 maf allocation. The states were also charged with building
the necessary infrastructure and providing the necessary funding for delivering the water to
reservations, finally pushing the “paper water” that had long been promised to Native American
tribes towards “wet water” (Summit, 201). Therefore, Arizona vs California helped settle
long-standing interstate disputes as well as dictated states had the responsibility to deliver water
to reservations.
Arizona vs California also paved the way for congressional approval of the Central
Arizona Project (CAP). In order for Arizona to apply their allotment of the Colorado River to a
“beneficial use”, as mandated by the law of prior appropriation, it would have to transport the
water from the Colorado River, located on the border of California and Arizona, to the center of
the state where the growing metropolises of Phoenix and Tucson created the highest demand for
water (Poupeau 2016). The original bill introduced to congress to create CAP included plans for
a dam at Bridge Canyon that would potentially flood a large portion of the Grand Canyon,
including Navajo, Havasupai, and Hualapai land. The Hualapai, once Arizona agreed to their
demands for financial compensation and entitlement to the tourist revenue the dam would
generate, gave their support for the dam (Pearson, 2000). However, the Navajo, who is the
largest tribe of the Colorado River Indian Tribes, was not included in negotiations over the
proposed dams. Joining forces with the Sierra Club, who wanted to maintain the natural flow of
the Colorado River through the Grand Canyon, the Navajo launched a successful media
campaign against the dam resulting in its removal from the CAP bill. CAP was eventually
approved in 1968 and, instead of being built using hydroelectric power from the proposed dam,
was fueled using coal power plants located on Navajo land (Summit, 2012). Although the power
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plants provided an income for the Navajo community, the project disproportionately benefited
the state of Arizona, which now had the necessary infrastructure to use 1.5 maf of its 2.5 maf
allotment, while the environmental burden of building CAP was placed on the Navajo
community (Curly, 2021).
Moving Away from Litigation
In the past two decades, governance of the Colorado River basin has moved away from a
confrontational approach relying on litigation to work out disputes, to a more collaborative
approach. Arizona vs California gave the Secretary of the Interior the ability to organize
negotiations between states. From 2000 to 2007, Lake Mead’s water levels dropped by 45%,
prompting the Secretary of the Interior to exercise this power and convene the seven basin states.
These negotiations lead to the 2007 Interim Guidelines, the first basin wide plan for instituting
water cuts based on water levels in Lake Mead. In 2016, the states convened again to create the
2019 Drought Contingency Plan to supplement and clarify the 2007 Interim Guidelines. The
details of these two policies will be outlined in Chapter 3, but they mark a departure from
litigation between states to resolve conflicts in the Colorado River basin, toward collaboration.
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
Over the past thirty years, an extensive literature on participatory water governance has
emerged. This chapter traces the evolution of different frameworks and models of participatory
water management that relate to water struggles in the Colorado River basin. It explores the
literature of integrated water resources management (IWRM) and adaptive governance (AG).
Given the asymmetries of power that characterize the set of stakeholders (SHs) that seek to
engage in water management in the case of Arizona, this chapter also lays out best practices for
structuring SH engagement and explores the conditions necessary to facilitate the voice of less
powerful SHs to participate in water management. In addition, this chapter analyzes the
conditions necessary to facilitate the shift of water governance structures to a more adaptive and
participatory model. Through this review of the literature, I will build a framework of analysis to
explore the case of adaptive and participatory governance in Arizona and the lower Colorado
River basin, and the window of opportunity that is opening to facilitate a more inclusive and
adaptive shift.
Integrated Water Resources Management
Over the past few decades, the United States has developed more inclusive approaches to
governing water resources. Throughout the early to mid twentieth century, the US approached
water governance from a single-sector, hydro-centric perspective. Favored by engineers and
economists, this approach limited discussion of water management to a small group of
technocrats who sought to produce maximum yields and access the full utility of rivers and other
bodies of water (Hooper, 2013). During this period the US federal government invested in a
series of major infrastructure projects to maximize the utility of water resources, including the
Glen Canyon Dam and the Hoover Dam on the Colorado River (Gerlak, 2006).
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The 1980s marked a shift away from a technocratic approach to water governance as
water professionals realized the social and political complexity of water systems and the
problems they faced. Water resources often exist in transboundary spaces and are connected to a
variety of different water users who employ the water for a variety of different purposes. A
top-down, sectoral approach to water management lacks the flexibility and representation to
confront complex water management issues that are multi-sectoral and affect a diverse number of
interests (GWP, 2000; Biswas, 2006).
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) emerged as a governance framework
to create a more inclusive and systematic approach to managing water resources. IWRM
demands a multisectoral and cross-institutional approach to governing water resources (Gerlak,
2006). The Global Water Partnership, a network of over 3,000 institutions including United
Nations agencies, NGOs, and government regulatory bodies from various counties, developed a
framework for IWRM. They define IWRM as “a process which promotes the co-ordinated
development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the
resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the
sustainability of vital ecosystems” (2000). IWRM emphasizes a shift of the scale of analysis
from the administrative boundary to the level of the watershed or other hydrological boundaries
(Savenji & Van Der Zaag, 2008). This allows management practices to align better with the
ecological systems that impact water resources and addresses the “ecological integrity” policy
principle of IWRM. It also requires coordination between different sectors and agencies of
government, as hydrological boundaries rarely fall neatly within jurisdictional boundaries.
Additionally, IWRM recognizes the connection between water resources and the economic,
societal, and other environmental sectors (Hooper, 2003). Using an IWRM approach enables
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water managers to confront the diverse and multi-sectoral problems facing water resources by
integrating different sectors of government and approaching water management from the basin
scale.
A key characteristic of IWRM is participatory governance and the inclusion of water
users in the decision making process. This expands the process of water governance to include
not just government actors, but also community members, business and industry organizations,
NGOs, and other actors who have a “stake” or interest in a water resource (Hooper, 2003). By
including a variety of water users, IWRM scholars argue water management decisions will be
more cognisant of the interconnected relations of actors within a watershed and the variety of
goals and agendas these water users have (Savenji & Van Der Zaag, 2008). The GWP
emphasizes the difference between consultation and participation, and places the responsibility
of creating venues for participation on the local, regional, and national levels of government
(GWP, 2000). In the IWRM framework, participation in the decision making process must be
integrated at all levels of government.
Despite the IWRM’s emphasis on ecological integrity, flexibility, and participation,
scholars have criticized the approach for being vaguely defined. Biswas (2008 & 2004) analyzed
the definition and framework laid out by the GWP. The GWP divides their framework of IWRM
into three central components: ecological integrity, equity, and efficiency (GWP, 2000; Savenji &
Van Der Zaag, 2008). He criticizes their use of the words “equitable”, “sustainable”, and
“economic and social welfare” for benign empty signifiers that reference important values for
good governance, making the concept attractive and popular among major international
organizations. Moreover, the GWP does not fully define or explore the key terms of their
definition, making IWRM difficult to operationalize as a governance framework and allowing for
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a broad interpretation of the definition that can be adapted to fit a variety of different projects
(Biswas, 2004; 2009).
IWRM is limited in its ability to grapple with the complexities of engaging SHs. IWRM
attempts to move away from a top down, technocratic approach by engaging state and nonstate
actors, but in its operationalization the problems water users are being consulted on are often
defined by the state and experts. This excludes the perspective of non-state actors from the
framing of the problem (Heitema et al, 2009). Furthermore, the framework assumes that power is
centralized in the government, and the inclusion of SHs in the decision making process
redistributes the imbalance of power between state and nonstate actors and democratizes the
process (Butler & Adamowski, 2015). It does not examine the socio-political and historical
context of different SHs, and therefore glosses over the power imbalances between different
groups (Saravanan et al, 2009). Butler & Adamowski (2015) argue that the marginalization of
some actors, such as indigenous groups, creates barriers to engaging in SH initiatives. Pulling
from LeBlanc (2007), they define marginalization as:
“‘the process through which persons are peripheralized on the basis of their identities,
associations, experiences, and environments’ (LeBlanc, 1997). Marginalization is experienced
through having minimal access to resources, association to cultural norms, and representation
(this includes cultural representation in things such as media, or decision-making bodies like
governments, organizations, and corporations)” (Butler & Adamowski, 2015; LeBlanc, 2007).
Indigneous communities may lack the freetime, ability to travel to meeting locations, and access
to information. These gaps need to be accounted for in planning for participatory programs to
ensure marginalized groups are able to engage. Without addressing these barriers, the SH
engagement process is seen by participants as a formality or a bureaucratic box to check, and
often alienating SHs from the process and decreasing trust between state and non-state actors
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(Wehn et al, 2018). IWRM fails to acknowledge the power dynamics between SHs, allowing for
the potential exclusion of marginalized groups.
Over the past two decades, Arizona and other Southwestern states have begun moving
from a technocratic approach to water management to a more participatory and collaborative
approach. In recent drought negotiations, they have made an effort to include tribal nations, who
have been historically barred from participating in water management decisions (Sullivan et al,
2019). The second chapter discusses that, in the process of trying to build a more participatory
and inclusive water management system, Arizona’s application of an IWRM approach
demonstrated many of the gaps noted above. Specifically, the chapter demonstrates the state's
failure to address historical legacies and asymmetries of power that continued to marginalize
indigenous voices.
Adaptive Governance: Flexibility, Learning, and Creating an Equitable Process for Public
Participation
By the 2000s, another conceptual model of water governance emerged. Like IWRM,
adaptive governance (AG) emphasizes watersheds and river basins as the primary jurisdiction.
Unlike IWRM, the literature informing AG recognizes that power imbalances between SHs
must be addressed to create an effective participatory process. In addition, adaptive governance
recognizes that water resources face uncertainty and unpredictability, and emphasizes flexibility
and social learning in water management. IWRM strives to optimize for a specific ecosystem
service to fit a current economic need or political goal (Savenji & Van Der Zaag, 2008). In
contrast, Cosens & Williams (2012) define adaptive governance as an approach to managing
transboundary water resources that addresses the inherent uncertainties in a system’s response to
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management changes. They argue that adaptive governance takes a more systems driven
approach by discussing the connection between ecosystems and socio-economic systems.
AG is operationalized through the implementation of adaptive management to promote
flexibility within the policies governing ecosystems. Adaptive management seeks to achieve the
flexibility demanded by the scholarship of AG through the consistent monitoring and revaluation
of actions and policies that impact an ecosystem. This allows for a process of learning from
experimental policies in which their effects on an ecosystem are recorded and analyzed, and the
policy is adjusted based on this analysis in order to accommodate changes and surprises that
occur within the system (Cosens & Williams, 2012; Folke et al 2005) Olsson, Folke & Hahn
(2004) describes this process in their analysis of the Ecomuseum Kristianstads Vattenrike (EKV),
which was established by the Municipality of Kristianstad to manage the Helgeå River in
Sweden. The EKV maintained an inventory of bird populations to assess the effects of varying
nutrient loads on the river’s ecosystem. These inventories were shared with the public and a
variety of other actors, including farmers who were able to adjust their land practices based on
the information provided by EKV’s inventories. This allowed for a process of learning by
experimenting with different approaches to land and water management, and prompted
information sharing between the government and water users to create collaborative solutions
based on the available data. Learning and reevaluating past actions based on conclusions drawn
from policy monitoring is an essential component of the implementation of AG.
Similar to IWRM, the scholarship on AG recognizes SH (SH) engagement as integral to
the operationalization of adaptive governance to support collaboration between state and
non-state actors. When done well, SH engagement includes SHs throughout the entire decision
making process, including the process of knowledge production. Engaging SHs in the knowledge
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generation process allows for social learning, or the process of learning from collectives or
groups (Smyth et al, 2020; Wehn et al, 2018). Social learning enables SHs and policymakers to
gain a better understanding of the issues being discussed and to gather a diverse set of
experiences and perspectives from participants, creating a broader knowledge base for making
informed decisions. Wehn et al (2018) describe the process of engaging SHs to discuss the future
of water governance in England organized by the Department of Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs (DEFRA). As part of this process, DERFA showed a series of graphics and images
displaying the current water governance structure in England. Participants were then asked to
discuss and create a collective definition of the governance structure. As a result, participants had
a clear understanding of how water regulation was operationalized by DERFA. This allowed
them to observe gaps and failures in the regulatory process, and create an informed opinion on
their concerns and desired improvements.
Engaging SHs in knowledge production, however, comes with its own set of challenges.
Smyth et al (2020) analyzed a variety of different research initiatives across various countries in
North and Southern America that intended to engage SHs in the process of collecting scientific
data on the effects of climate change on aquatic ecosystems. They found the process was more
successful in cases where researchers had a long-standing history of involvement in ecosystem
co-management programs. This provided a strong foundation of trust, inspiring a high degree of
engagement from SHs and enabling communication between SHs and scientists. Smyth et al
(2020) also stressed the importance of consulting SHs on the structure of the SH engagement
process and the constant reevaluation of the process by participants. This connects to the broader
goals of adaptive governance, which emphasizes the monitoring and analysis of programs and
policies in order to adjust these based on the weaknesses and limitations observed.
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The marginalization of certain SH groups is another challenge organizers face when
crafting participatory approaches to the knowledge generation processes and SH engagement
initiatives in general (Butler & Adamowski, 2015). In the U.S., indigenous communities face a
set of conditions that have led to their economic and political marginalization. For example, in
the Colorado River basin, reservations have not been supplied by federal or state governments
with the funding necessary to develop the water they are entitled to. A report by the water and
tribes initiative found, “Navajo residents are 67 times more likely than other Americans to live
without access to running water” (2021). Historically, tribal nations have been unable to
advocate for themselves, as they have been shut out of water governance discussions since the
1922 Colorado River Compact (Tulley-Cordova, 2022). This process of marginalization,
especially in how it manifests within water governance as explored in the following chapter,
must be considered by the state when designing SH engagement initiatives.
Indigenous peoples must be included in the design of the SH process so they are able to
craft a process that will benefit them as much as the researcher and their affiliate institution.
These initiatives are most successful when researchers and organizers undergo an extensive
amount of prior research to understand the context of the nation they are engaging with, and
must be aware of what knowledge tribal members may find inappropriate to share. This also
allows the researcher to understand each specific tribal nation’s relationship with the resource
under discussion, and gain a better understanding of indigenous knowledge systems (Chief et al,
2016). Although the inclusion of SHs throughout the entire SH process increases their
engagement and the effectiveness of SH initiatives, the organizers of this process must consult
SHs in the construction of the process and recognize the context of marginalized groups who are
participating. This smoothing of inequities within a SH engagement process is critical to trust
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building and, when done poorly, can have negative consequences for future collaborations, as
demonstrated by Arizona's earlier SH engagement in the second chapter.
The Role of Policy Windows in Facilitating Adaptive Governance
The push for participatory, equitable, and flexible governance of water resources that is
required to meet the complex and constantly evolving challenges facing watersheds is in large
part due to specific political conditions that draw attention to the failures of the previous
structure. The literature on social movements and policy formation provide a framework for how
these transitions occur. Policy windows allow social movements and key individuals to reframe
problems and enact policy change guided by their perspective. Focusing events contribute to
creating a political environment that is receptive to change and motivates policy-makers to create
or adjust regulations.
A policy window allows advocates of a proposed solution to a problem to propel their
idea to the top of the agenda of policy makers and the public. John Kingdon (1984) describes a
policy window as an opening or opportunity for reform or policy shifts created by the union of
three streams: the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream. The problem
stream identifies public matters requiring government intervention, such as the shrinking of Lake
Mead. Most problems do not catch the attention of the government or the public. Kingdon argues
they require a solution that can be implemented in order to be salient to policy makers. The
policy stream is the stream of proposed ideas and solutions. In Arizona, the policy stream
consists of the drafted DCP or the proposed idea for a “Sovereign Review Board'' to guide
governance of the Colorado River basin. Kingdon describes the political stream with a broad
definition of “political” as “any activity related to the authoritative allocation of values”(1984,
145). In the case of Arizona, the political stream involves indigenous social movements for
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representation in water governance or a declaration by the Bureau of Reclamation of a tier 1
shortage as a result of Lake Mead’s water level.
A window of opportunity can appear when a solution that policy makers, scientists, or
others have crafted is ready to be applied to remedy the problem at hand. These streams usually
run parallel to each other, but a change in one of these streams, such as an election affecting the
political stream, can cause them to align. At that moment, interest groups or savvy individuals
are able to take advantage of the receptive political environment to push their proposed solution
forward and enact change. For example, Arizona’s sudden panic that it would not be able to meet
its commitments to interstate drought agreements allowed the Gila River Indian Community and
the Colorado River Tribes to bargain for a spot in SH meetings and claim some influence over
proposed drought policy.
Sudden focusing events can draw the attention of the public or government to a problem
that was previously low on the agenda, creating a window of opportunity. Thomas Birkland
(1997) defines a focusing event as “an event that is sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonable
defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of greater future harms, inflicts harms or suggests
potential harms that could be concentrated on a definable geographical area or community of
interest, and that is known to policy makers and the public virtually simultaneously.” A focusing
event can describe a variety of different occurrences, including a natural disaster, an aviation
accident, an oil spill, ect. In the case of the basin, as noted above, the extreme drop in Lake Mead
due to drought caused a spike in interest that groups or individuals use to illustrate the need for
immediate actions and draw greater attention to the problem. If prepared with a policy solution
able to address the problem highlighted by a focusing event, these actors can use the heightened
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public and political interest to facilitate the implementation of their proposal (Kingdon, 1984).
These sudden events act as catalysts to connect the three streams described by Kingdon.
Social Movements, the networks they facilitate, and the leaders who emerge from them,
also play a key role in facilitating the opening of a policy window. Sidney Tarrow (1994)
describes how networks begin at the local level consisting of interpersonal relationships between
individuals and informal organizations who share a common opponent. These local networks
connect with formal organizations, such as NGOs and Universities, to expand their reach to the
state, national, or international level, gathering more interest in the problem they are facing and
challenging the ability of elites to subvert the movement. Not only do these networks increase
the scale of the movement, but they also facilitate exchanges of information (Olsson et al., 2006).
Experts and everyday people connect creating an exchange of local knowledge and scientific
knowledge that inspires possible policy solutions. As Kingdon (1984) argues, an applicable
solution to a problem allows for the formation and exploitation of a policy window. The
information that flows through the networks created by social movements provide both policy
ideas and build coalitions of groups to support them, helping to craft the receptive environment
for enacting change.
Kingdon (1984) describes the importance of individuals who act as leaders during the
opening of a policy window to mobilize resources and push their preferred policy forward. He
refers to these individuals as “policy entrepreneurs” who act as integral pieces to both the
formation and exploitation of policy windows. These individuals hitch solutions to existing
problems, draw the connection between focusing events and policy problems, and couple the
momentum gathered by social movements with specific policy proposals. Policy entrepreneurs
can be situated within the state, giving them access to official policy channels they can mobilize
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when the opportunity arises. They can also be individuals located outside of the government,
such as scientists, academics, and activists, who can draw on the networks they are connected to
and the coalitions they are a part of to rally in support of a policy solution to a pressing problem.
Individuals that operate outside of the state are also subject to less regulatory constraints and
have the ability to push for major structural change, while those operating within the state are
subject to bureaucratic regulation that steers them toward policy solutions that focus on
incremental changes (Huitema & Meijerink, 2010). While networks and coalitions are essential
for invigorating support for a policy and creating pathways for exchanges of information,
individual leaders help to couple these developments with specific problems and solutions to
open and seize upon widows of opportunity.
Policy windows, as well as the movements and focusing events that assist in opening
them, result in shifts of governance structures. Olsson et al (2006) describes how these
transformations consisted of two phases, a preparation phase and a transition phase, linked by a
window of opportunity. The foundation for this transition is supported by networks of scientists
and other academics, interest groups, and individuals who recognize the failings of the current
governance structure and the resulting problems in a social-ecological system. These informal
networks identify knowledge gaps and create nodes of expertise of significance for ecosystem
management that can be drawn upon at critical times. This provides a common understanding of
the problem and puts in place policy ideas that can be mobilized when a window opens. In the
case of AG, a window of opportunity often results from an ecological crisis (Folke, 2015; Olsson
et al, 2006).
A crisis, such as an extreme weather event or extensive ecosystem damage, catches the
attention of the public and the state. Policy entrepreneurs then have the opportunity to leverage

32
this attention to push for a transition to a more adaptive form of governance. Policy
entrepreneurs are essential in this process, as they connect informal networks with government
organizations, and provide leadership in rallying disparate groups to coalesce under one solution.
The structure of AG consists of regulatory responsibility that is distributed between various
levels of government, and across state and non-state organizations. The informal networks
developed early on in the process can provide the basis for this structure, and can later be
formalized to institutionalize AG (Chaffin, 2014; Folke, 2015).
Focusing events play a key role in creating a window of opportunity for policy
intervention and a restructuring of governance systems. Periods of crisis allow for the
implementation of a structure of adaptive governance. These moments of crisis make problems
facing ecosystems a top priority on the policy agenda. Key individuals who act as leaders or
policy entrepreneurs help to organize informal social networks that are able to identify
knowledge gaps, policy failings, and develop new approaches to resolving resource problems
unhindered by an obligation to an agency. Successful social transformations toward adaptive
governance for ecosystem management seem to be preceded by the emergence of informal
networks, orchestrated by key individuals, that help facilitate information flows, identify
knowledge gaps, and create nodes of expertise of significance for ecosystem management that
can be drawn upon at critical times (Folke, 2015; Chaffin, 2014).
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Chapter 3: The Case of Arizona and the Colorado River Basin
This chapter will discuss the case of Arizona and the state’s involvement with
interstate-drought negotiations for the Colorado River. I will describe the Arizona Department of
Water Resources’ (ADWR) stakeholder engagement initiatives, including the Steering
Committee that informed the 2019 DCP and the Arizona Reconsultation Committee (ARC) that
is currently in progress. I will also explore the role of social movements and focusing events in
creating the political climate necessary to move forward with a more participatory drought policy
in Arizona.
The case narrative is based on primary data from interviews I conducted with Anne
Castle, Crystal Tulley-Cordova, and Thomas Throssell. Anne Castle is a senior fellow at
Getches-Wilkinson Center for Natural Resources, and is an expert on water issues in the US
Southwest and Colorado River operating policy. From 2009 to 2014, she was the Assistant
Secretary for Water and Science at the US Department of the Interior. Crystal Tulley-Cordova is
a Principal Hydrologist in the Navajo Nation Department of Water Resources- Water
Management Branch. Thomas Throssell is the outreach coordinator for tribal water users at the
Central Arizona Project (CAP). The interviews I conducted with these water professionals
provide varying perspectives on information I gathered through primary and secondary sources.
Climate Change and Drought in the US Southwest
The Colorado River depends on snowpack on the Rocky and Wasatch Mountain ranges as
a stable source of runoff to maintain the river’s flow. The melting of snow and ice allows water
to percolate through the soil into underground aquifers. The water in these aquifers resurfaces as
streamflow into the Colorado River. Milly & Dunne (2020) predicts the flow of the Colorado
River to decrease by 9.3% for every 1°C of warming due to decreasing snowpack. Climate
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change has triggered a reinforcing feedback loop in the mountains that causes more water to be
lost to evapotranspiration. As temperatures increase, ice and snowpack on the mountains melt at
a faster pace, and more precipitation falls as rain instead of snow. As a result there is less snow
and ice covering the mountain. Ice and snow have a higher albedo, or surface reflectivity, than
rock and dirt meaning surfaces covered by ice and snow reflect more heat rather than absorb it.
The albedo of the surfaces of the mountains is decreasing as a result of shrinking snowpack,
causing them to absorb more heat instead of reflecting it. Consequently, the ground and soils heat
up causing water to evaporate before it can recharge underground aquifers. The decrease in
surface albedo then causes more ice and snow to melt, decreasing the albedo even more and
reinforcing the system.
This snow loss is coupled with climate change causing megadroughts throughout the US
Southwest. Udall & Overpeck (2017) found the period 2000-2014 to be the worst 15 year
drought on record in the Colorado River Basin. The average flow of the Colorado River during
this period was 19.3% below the average flow from the between 1906-1999. The drought, which
continues into 2022 as a 22 year drought, is a severe, multi-decade long drought called a
“megadrought”. Ault et al (2016) modeled the risk of mega drought occurrences in the US
Southwest throughout the end of the 21st century. According to their analysis, under a business
as usual scenario in which emissions are not curbed to keep warming below 2°C, there is over a
99% risk that there will be a continued occurrence of megroughts throughout the 21st century.
Megadroughts, such as the one the Colorado River is currently experiencing, will therefore
continue to occur throughout the next 100 years as a result of climate change, placing continued
stress on the limited water resources available in the region.
Arizona’s Response to Drought
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In 2000, the Colorado River entered into the worst drought conditions experienced in one
hundred years of recorded history. Between the years 2000 and 2007, the river's reservoirs
dropped from being near full to 55% capacity (US Bureau of Reclamation, 2007b). This
megadrought brought to light the serious structural deficit built into the Colorado River compact.
Under normal conditions, Lake Mead receives about 9 maf of water per year from tributaries and
Lake Powell. However, in creating Lake Mead, the designers failed to realize that damming the
river would increase the surface area of water exposed to heat and wind. Lake Mead now loses
about 800,000 af to evaporation per year, which is about double Nevada’s allocation from the
river (Udall, 2017). Therefore, Lake Mead loses about 10.2 maf per year from supplying water to
the lower basin states and evaporation, creating a deficit of 1.2 maf. The megadrought in the
early 2000s intensified this deficit. Without intervention from the federal government to organize
potential cuts to water users, it became likely the Lower Basin States would turn to litigation.
In 2007, the Secretary of the Interior along with the seven basin states agreed upon the
2007 Interim Guidelines detailing their response in the event a shortage is declared (Colorado
River Research Group, 2015). A tier 1 shortage, as defined by the guidelines, is when water
levels in Lake Mead are below or equal to 1075ft. California, being the first state of the lower
basin states to appropriate water from the Colorado River, has priority water rights. Therefore, a
tier 1 shortage results in cuts to Arizona and Nevada’s water supply (US Bureau of Reclamation,
2007b). The Interim Guidelines also created a mechanism that allowed states to store water in
Lake Mead to be used in future years. This initiative, called Intentionally Created Surplus,
accounts for conservation initiatives implemented by states and the surplus in Lake Mead that
these initiatives create, and allows states to access this surplus water in future years (Stern &
Sheikh, 2021).
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In 2016, water levels in Lake Mead dropped to 1071ft, and a shortage was narrowly
avoided. The nearly avoided shortage brought into focus the ambiguous language that defines
federal intervention in Colorado River management under a shortage scenario (Sullivan, 2019).
The interim guidelines state, “the Secretary shall evaluate and take additional necessary actions,
as appropriate, at critical elevations in order to avoid Lower Basin shortage determinations as
reservoir conditions approach critical thresholds” (US Bureau of Reclamation, 2007b). The
interim guidelines fail to define what the “additional necessary actions'' are and the process for
instituting cuts to state allocations in the event of a shortage. When the interim guidelines were
originally implemented, the basin states agreed that their renegotiation would occur in 2020
(Colorado River Research Group, 2015). However, Lake Mead’s brief dip into a tier 1 shortage
level and the lack of a clearly defined response incentivised states to begin this negotiation
process in 2018. This negotiation process would lead to the 2019 Drought Contingency Plan
(DCP).
The DCP negotiation process began with two separate negotiations between states in the
lower basin and between states in the upper basin. As part of these negotiations, Arizona
developed the Steering Committee, a group of SHs from tribal communities, municipal water
agencies, agricultural organizations, and NGOs, to define Arizona’s priorities in the inter-state
negotiation process. DCP negotiations came close to failure as the deadline for the agreement
approached and Arizona, who had to first pass legislation in the state congress before their
representative to the negotiations could sign the agreement, held up the process. In 2019, within
minutes of the deadlines set by the DOI, Arizona passed the necessary legislation agreeing to the
DCP conditions and allowing the state representative to sign the agreement (Stern & Sheik,
2021).
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The DCP defines a tier 1 shortage as occurring when levels in Lake Mead are between
1,090ft and 1,045ft. A tier 2 shortage is defined as when levels in Lake Mead drop below
1,045ft. In the event of a tier 1 shortage, Arizona’s allotment of water is cut by 192,000 af and
Nevada’s by 8,000 af. In the event of a tier 2 shortage, Arizona, Nevada, and California will all
face cuts to their allotment amounting to 240,000 af, 8,000 af, and 200,000 af respectively (DCP
Operating Agreement). Shortages are declared on January 1st of the year prior, after the
Department of the Interior publishes its annual report on the operating levels of Lake Mead
(USBR). Through clearly defined cuts to water users at different shortage levels, the DCP
provided a much greater degree of certainty to the states and SHs on the process of implementing
cuts in the face of a shortage.
The clarity provided by the DCP has proven useful, as a tier 1 shortage was declared for
2022, meaning Arizona and Nevada will both face cuts to their allocation of the Colorado River
in the coming year. Although the DCP has defined the process of instituting water cuts under a
shortage scenario, further challenges remain. As noted earlier, both the DCP and the interim
guidelines are temporary plans that are set to expire in 2026. Plus, both agreements only dictate
the process of protecting water levels in the Colorado River under emergency shortage scenarios,
and do not create a long term plan to address the 2.2 maf deficit caused by evaporation in Lake
Mead and the general overallocation of the Colorado River since the 1922 Colorado River
Compact. In addition, climate change and increasing population will continue to increase stress
on the water resources in the Southwest. To address these issues, the Department of the Interior
will formulate a long term plan for conserving the Colorado River. The deadline for this plan is
set to 2026, when the Interim Guidelines and DCP will expire, and many states have already
begun formulating their agendas for the coming negotiations.
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To organize the state’s agenda, Arizona has restarted the Steering Committee formed
during the DCP negotiations, renaming it the ARC. The ARC will engage a variety of SHs in
discussion in order to define Arizona’s priorities in the negotiations that will decide the future of
conserving the Colorado River.
Table 1: Drought Guidelines for the Colorado River basin
Drought Plan

2007 Interim
Guidelines

2019 Drought
Contingency
Plan (DCP)

2026 Operating
Guidelines

AZ total cuts to
allocation

Arizona SH
Engagement
Initiative

None

Steering
Committee

Arizona
Reconsultation
Committee
(ARC)

SHs invited to
participate

None

See appendix i

See appendix ii

Tier 0 Shortage
≤ 1,090

0

192,000af

-

192,000af

Tier 1 Shortage
≤1,075

320,000af

192,000af

-

512,000af

Tier 2a Shortage
≤

400,000af

192,000af

-

592,000af

Tier 2b Shortage
≤

400,000af

240,000af

-

640,000af

Tier 3 Shortage
≤

480,000af

2400af

-

720,000af

Arizona’s Stakeholder Engagement
The ADWR created the Steering Committee to provide feedback on drafts of both the
DCP and Arizona’s plan for implementing the DCP within the State. Thirteen meetings were
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held between July, 2018 to February of 2019. These meetings were made up of 38 water
professionals including members of ADWR, municipal water representatives, tribal leaders from
three Arizona Tribal nations, and agricultural representatives, among others (see appendix i for
full list of participants).
The first two meetings focused on creating a base level of understanding among
participants. These meetings consisted of technical presentations to describe the state of the
Colorado River, the policies already in place, and the structure of the SH engagement process.
The first meeting dived into the hydrology of the Colorado River and the predicted effects of
climate change on the river. The presentation then shifted to a discussion of the DCP, with
questions being collected online from the SHs and members of the general public present. The
following meeting addressed the questions collected. Note that the Bureau of Reclamation and
the lower basin states had already created a potential draft of the DCP at the time these SH
meetings began. SHs were not involved in the process of creating or informing the initial draft.
The following eleven meetings continued providing updates on hydrology and the status
of operating guidelines, while also providing space for SH comments on the DCP draft. The
meetings began with a brief introduction of each participant, followed by a presentation on the
current levels of Lake Mead and Lake Powell. Then, the participants would focus on a selected
section of the DCP draft for each meeting, and provide their concerns or desired changes to that
particular part of the draft. These meetings lasted for up to three and a half hours, with the first
two hours being dedicated to introductions and presentation materials, and the second hour and a
half devoted to comments from participants.
ARC is structured almost identically to the Steering Committee, with the addition of a
few new members and the Modeling and Analysis Work Group. ARC includes a representative
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from the Tohono O’Odham Nation, the Gila River Indian Community, and the Colorado River
Tribes, as the Steering Committee did, along with a lawyer from the Mohave County Water
Authority to help represent tribal interests. In contrast to the Steering Committee meetings, as a
result of COVID, ARC meetings are held virtually instead of in person. The committee is also
accompanied by the Modeling and Analysis Work Group (MAWG). MAWG works on creating
projections for the flow of the Colorado River in future years to help inform the Reconsulation
Committee on different drought scenarios. With MAWG, the ADWR has the opportunity to
include SHs in the knowledge generation process. All ARC members are invited to participate in
MAWG meetings. Unfortunately, these meetings are not publicly available, making it difficult to
assess their success in this endeavor, and signaling a lack of transparency in this part of the
process. Apart from the addition of another representative to advocate for tribal nations and the
formation of MAWG, the format for ARC meetings follow the same structure as the Steering
Committee, with expert presentations followed by SH discussion.
Building an Inclusive SH Engagement Process
The inclusion of Indigenous SHs reflects some opening towards indigenous participation
by the state of Arizona after tribal nations were completely excluded from the formation of the
2007 Interim Guidelines. According to Anne Castle, a legal expert and former Assistant
Secretary of Water and Science at the DOI, tribal communities have been fighting for recognition
and inclusion in Arizona’s SH engagement process since their exclusion from the Interim
Guidelines. The Gila River Indian Community and the Colorado River Tribes were included on
the Steering Committee, but their inclusion was largely influenced by the need for Arizona to
strike a deal with these tribes to meet their DCP commitments. Arizona’s participation in the
2019 DCP was made possible through an agreement in which each tribe consented to leave
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50,000 acre-feet of water in Lake Mead each year for three years. In exchange, each tribe will
receive $250 per acre feet, or $12.5 million each year. At the time, this reduced the threat of a
shortage being declared under the DCP that would result in cuts to Arizona’s allocation from the
Colorado River. According to Castle noted that:
“The Lower Basin, DCP agreement somewhat belatedly included some of the lower basin tribes,
and interestingly, at least two lower basin tribes who were instrumental in contributing to the
conditions that allowed the lower basin DCP to come together. They [the Gila River Indian
Community and the Colorado River Indian Tribes] basically did deals for water that offset some
of the reductions that Arizona was agreeing to take as part of the DCP. They made the whole
thing work. But tribes were not initially involved in those discussions. They protested that
exclusion and were able to achieve some broader participation, but it was not by any means all
the tribes in Arizona. And I would say they didn't really shape the agreement” (Castle, 2022).
The Steering Committee ended up including these two tribes, along with the Tohono
O’odham Nation, but it still excluded the 20 other federally recognized tribes located within
Arizona. Recently, The ADWR has invited three tribes to participate in the ARC: The Gila River
Indian Community, the Colorado River Indian Tribes, and The Tohono O’odham. These three
tribes are members of the Intertribal Council of Arizona, an organization of 21 tribal nations
located in Arizona that seeks to provide a united voice for tribal governments on common issues
they are facing. The three tribes participating in ARC are expected to report back to the
intertribal council on the affairs of ARC, and bring the concerns of the rest of the tribes to the
table (Throssell, 2022). Although this demonstrates an attempted expansion of inclusion in the
drought planning process, these three tribes are expected to be able to represent the voice of all
22 tribal communities in Arizona, who are each facing their own unique challenges and
concerns.
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Image 1: Federally Recognized Tribes in Arizona
Tribes in Arizona, and across the Colorado
River basin as a whole, have been advocating
for a spot at the table, as their exclusion has
been the norm from the Colorado River
Compact since its inception in 1922 to the 2007
Interim Guidelines. Tulley-Cordova explains the
complexity of the situation indigenious groups
are in:
“At least as far as participation is concerned, it
has been a carbon copy since 1922. It was a
federal and state process, tribes had no
participation in that. And the real challenge now
is determining how you include people who were excluded previously? Granted, the history was
that we should probably be dead because of the different orders that were done by the federal
government to exterminate indigenous people. So those are hard conversations to have when
you're the thorn in people's side for wanting to be included” (Tulley-Cordova, 2022).

Tulley-Cordova describes the resistance that exists within the state to include indigenous actors
that further complicates an already complicated system as the state attempts to move away from
a technocratic approach to water governance.
Castle describes the complexity the ADWR faces when engaging with tribal SHs in the
state of Arizona. She says:
“And, you know, it's a difficult situation on both sides in that the state of Arizona has 22 tribes
and, you know, you've got a Reconsultation committee that's like 15 or 20 people and you don't
wanna double that by including every tribe and every tribe wouldn't participate, because they
don't have the resources to participate. But, at the same time, you know, the white Mountain
Apache will tell you that there's no way the Gila River Indian Community can represent their
interest. And there's no organized forum that would allow a tribal representative or two or three
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to be selected that would be empowered and required to represent the interests of more tribes”
(Castle, 2022).
Including all the tribes on the ARC would double the amount of seats at the table. Importantly,
Castle says not every tribe would even participate, specifically because they don’t have the
resources.
On this point, Arizona was critiqued by indigenous SHs during the DCP process for not
providing the resources required to facilitate the participation of tribal communities. In their
article published midway in the DCP process, Sullivan et al (2019) pointed to socio-economic,
distance, and time barriers that potentially deterred engagement in the Steering Committee
meetings:
“While the meetings were formally open to any interested individual or group, they were largely
held in the Phoenix, Arizona area and during multiple meetings, SHs mentioned traveling several
hours to attend and have their voices heard. This was disproportionately mentioned by
participants traveling from relatively remote Native American reservations in other parts of
Arizona. Efforts were made to allow SHs to participate remotely, via teleconferencing, but it
must be acknowledged that some interested SHs were likely excluded based on socio-economic
variables that influence the ability to access either equipment or phone/internet connections
required to participate remotely” (Sullivan et al, 2019).
They predicted that these barriers could lead to mistrust between SHs and between SHs and the
state, and that this could undermine the success of DCP negotiations. Through interviews,
Sullivan et al (2019) found significant disappointment among indigenoious SHs. A
representative of the Tohono O'odham nation expressed this sentiment saying, “Tribes were not
consulted one bit on the DCP” (Tohono O’odham Nation Representative, June 2017; Sullivan et
al, 2019). The Governor of the Gila River Indian Community stated in a letter to the CAP board:
“... the board meeting appears to have been largely arranged, without prior consultation on
schedules and I am unable to change my schedule…As an entity with both a Colorado River
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water entitlement and entitlements from other water systems, the Community has a unique
perspective on this need for coordination” (Governor of the Gila River Indian Community, June
2017; Sullivan et al, 2019).
Thomas Throssell, the outreach coordinator for tribal communities at CAP, described
how the state of Arizona attempts to grapple with the challenges of engaging with tribal SHs. As
part of his role at CAP, Throssell consults tribal members on how they wish the SH process to be
structured and visits reservations to ask members “How do you want us to engage with you?”.
He treats his role as an ambassador or delegation going abroad, respecting the sovereignty of
tribal nations. The process of going to reservations and meeting with tribal members on their
land is a valuable practice to counteract the barriers discussed above, as many of these
individuals do not have the time or resources to travel to Phoenix for CAP’s public meetings
(Throssel, 2022).
Unfortunately, this practice by Throssel as part of CAP’s general engagement with SHs
was not institutionalized into the Steering Committee or ARC. As a part of these two specific SH
processes, tribal members are still expected to either come to in person meetings, in the case of
the Steering Committee, or attend virtually. Throssell explained virtual access to meetings does
help tribal members who are located on remote reservations to join these discussions, but
acknowledges internet access and technology remain as barriers to participation for low income
individuals (Throssel, 2022). Arizona, specifically CAP, is working to meet with tribes on their
land and receive their input on the engagement process, but the structure of the Steering
Committee and ARC still include significant barriers to creating an inclusive participatory
process.
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ADWR’s structure of participation for the Steering Committee did not demonstrate the
flexibility required to be inclusive of a diverse set of SHs. Tribal representatives complained
about poor efforts to accommodate schedules. They also complained about the lack of adequate
consultation in crafting the DCP, as the DCP was already drafted by the time SHs were included
in the process. SH meetings resulted in tweaks to a draft already created without their perspective
having been included. This relates to the observations of Smyth et al (2020), Chief et al (2016),
and Wehn et al (2016) that SH participation is necessary in all steps of the process, including the
process of designing the structure of SH meetings, the knowledge generation process, policy
drafting, and policy implementation. This not only allows for the perspective of SHs to inform
the entire policy formation process, but also because it builds trust between SHs and between
SHs and the state.
Policy Windows in Arizona and the Colorado River Basin
A series of water crises have occurred throughout the Colorado River basin that have
sparked collaboration on policy solutions to current droughts conditions. Fleck & Castle (2022)
express the stop and go movement of drought policy in the Colorado River Basin. They explain:
“In the Colorado River Basin, climate has played the role of a traffic light. When it delivers dry
years, rapidly decreasing reservoirs create a “green light” condition to be monitored to a problem
to be solved. The “red light” turns back on when a good snowpack delivers above-average flows
to the reservoirs and refills depleted storage. The river game’s “green lights” and “red lights”
create a classic opening and closing policy window, as described by Kingdon” (Fleck & Castle,
2022).
Castle & Fleck’s analysis applies to the formation of the DCP, which the seven basin
states and the DOI began the process of negotiating in 2014 after two years of constantly low
runoff feeding the Colorado River (CRRG, 2020). The pressure to implement a drought plan
intensified in 2016, when Lake Mead hovered at 1,071.56ft, a record low, reinvigorating DCP
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negotiations that had begun to stagnate (Sullivan et al, 2019). In 2021, Lake Mead again reached
dangerously low levels, dropping to 1061.55 ft, another record low and the lowest point the
reservoir reached since its creation. 200 ft lower, and the reservoir would reach “deadpool” level
at which water can no longer run through Hoover Dam to supply electricity to 1.3 million people
across Nevada, Arizona, and California (Yetikyel, 2021). This recent drop in elevation, and the
subsequent shortages declared by the DOI, highlighted the failings of both the interim guidelines
and the DCP, and placed pressure on Arizona to begin discussions regarding the 2026 Operating
Guidelines for the Colorado River. As Lake Mead stubbornly remains at critically low levels, the
issue remains salient on the agenda of policy makers.
Social movements sparked by the COVID pandemic. Black Lives Matters and
environmental justice have also contributed to an opening of a window of opportunity. This
window of opportunity has the potential for the ADPW, on the state level, and the Department of
the Interior, on the Basin scale, to increase equity in the SH engagement process and to expand
water access on reservations. According to Castle:
“COVID really did shine a light on the disparity in access to clean drinking water on
reservations. There was a lot of press attention to the disproportionate impact of COVID, both
the hospitalization and deaths on reservations, and then some correlation, if not attribution, of
that disparity to lack of access to clean drinking water. So all of that is happening and I think was
influenced by the protests of the Black Lives Matter movement particularly after George Floyd's
death.”
There is the convergence of two crises, COVID and drought, and at the intersection of these two
crises lie indigenous communities who lack access to the clean water necessary to sanitize as
recommended by the CDC. A report by the Water & Tribes Initiative, an organization formed to
highlight the issues facing tribes in the Colorado River Basin, “Living in a Native household
dramatically increases the odds of being plumbing poor, with Native households being 19 times
more likely than white households to lack indoor plumbing with running water” (2021, pp. 15).
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In 2021, tribal Nations were hit especially hard by the COVID pandemic, with the Navajo Nation
surpassing the infection rates of hot spots like New York City. According to the report, “As of
March 25, 2021, the Navajo Nation has had 30,031 confirmed cases and 1,243 deaths. With
approximately 173,000 members residing on the reservation, the Navajo Nation is currently
experiencing 17,359 cases per 100,000, nearly twice the national rate” (Water & Tribes Initiative,
2021, pp. 9). At the time of the outbreak, President Nez of the Navajo Nation stated, “the
outbreak of COVID-19 on the Navajo Nation has largely been attributed to lack of water in the
homes of Navajo people . . . clean water is a sacred and scarce commodity” (Water & Tribes
Initiative, 2021, pp. 9). As Castle notes, COVID has spotlighted structural racism in the US and
the lack of access to clean water on reservations for the general public and policy makers.
The connection drawn by policy makers and the general public between COVID and
access to clean water has facilitated the distribution of targeted aid by the Federal Government in
its COVID relief legislation. According to Tulley-Cordova:
“It's crazy that people have to die at a significant rate to be able to be acknowledged. So yes, the
COVID 19 pandemic has a silver lining, meaning the correlation between COVID 19 cases and
the correlation with water access. And so what it has helped with is being able to get funding
through the Cares Act, the American Rescue Plan Act, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure law to
develop that infrastructure”
As described in Chapter Two, most reservations hold a large share of “paper water” rights that
require funding to build the infrastructure necessary to deliver this water to reservations. The
explicit connection between water access and the COVID outbreaks centralized on reservations
displayed the urgency of developing these water rights to the federal government. The Bipartisan
Infrastructure plan freed up $56 billion in small grants and low cost flexible loans for tribes and
disadvantaged communities across the country to modernize water systems (Baltz, 2021). As
drought and COVID emerged as two parallel crises, the spotlight shifted to highlight the
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disparities of water access in Arizona, and allowed for targeted federal legislation to increase
water access to underserved communities.
There has also been a shift to create more inclusive venues for indigenous participation in
the drought planning process. Policy entrepreneurs have been busy putting together proposals to
create new venues for indigenous participation in drought policy. Daryl Vigil is the water
administrator of the Jicarilla Apache Nation and the co-facilitator of the Water & Tribes
Initiative. In congressional testimony to the US Committee of Natural Resources, he proposed a
framework for conducting the interstates negotiations that will result in the 2026 Operating
Guidelines for the Colorado River. He proposes a Sovereign Governance Team made up of the
seven basin states, the federal government, and the tribes of the Colorado River basin. Vigil says
this could be created through a formalization of collaborative networks that are already forming:
“This new paradigm has been emerging organically over the past decade in the form of many
collaborations and partnerships among tribes, states, the federal government, SHs, and water
users” (2021). He acknowledges that Arizona and other states in the Colorado River baisn are
moving towards collaboration in addressing issues of drought.
The connections being formed between the state and tribes needs to be institutionalized to
create a venue that elevates tribal authorities to act alongside other sovereign powers. Currently,
tribes are represented as SHs who participate in state level venues such as the ARC or the
Steering Committee. The framework Vigil proposes would recognize the tribes as sovereign
members to the same degree as states and the federal government, providing the tribes with the
ability to directly influence the 2026 Operating Guidelines. Vigil argues, “Without this type of
structure, tribes will continue to bear the impacts of the unrealistic expectation that federal and
state sovereigns will effectively and responsibly represent tribal water interests along with their
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own. Tribes themselves, not state and federal officials, are in the best position to advocate for
and protect their own tribal interests'' (2021). The Biden Administration will need to create a
formal venue for conducting discussions on the 2026 Operating Guidelines that values states,
tribes, and the federal government as equals. This will result in a governance structure that
expands tribal sovereignty, instead of infringing upon it.
This chapter has laid out the case of Arizona as it engages SHs in the process of entering
into interstate drought negotiations. Arizona has improved its SH engagement process by
including more tribal voices in the decision making process, although scheduling, distance, and
internet access remain as forces of exclusion to many tribal members. This shift towards a more
inclusive SH engagement process resulted from persistent protests of tribal nations who have
been historically excluded from participating in these venues. Along with this movement
initiated by indigenous actors in Arizona, COVID and the Balck Lives Matter movement have
brought the attention of the state and federal government to the disparities of water access. These
events have connected the issues of drought, water access, and public health in the eyes of the
public and policy makers, loosening up much needed funding to move paper water rights to wet
water. The availability of funding, the severity of drought, and the increasing public interest in
disparities to water access have created a receptive political environment for implementing more
inclusive structures for participation in the drought planning process. Lead actors such as Dryl
Vigil have crafted new proposals for structuring the governance of the Colorado River Basin that
emphasize the sovereignty of tribal nations by empowering tribal nations to enter into
negotiations with the seven basin states and the federal government as equal players.

50
Chapter 4: Analytic Conclusion
The governance of the Colorado River Basin has shifted toward a more adaptive
approach. Adaptive governance emphasizes the process of monitoring the effects of policies and
making adjustments based on the knowledge gained through this process (Cosens & Williams,
2012; Folke et al 2005). In the case of Arizona, the Department of the Interior constantly
monitors and reports on levels of Lake Mead and Lake Powell. Through this process, the DOI
was able to recognize the 2007 Interim Guidelines were ineffective in addressing water loss in
Lake Mead, and initiated discussion to create the DCP to address the weaknesses they found. As
noted earlier, both the DCP and the 2007 Interim Guidelines are set to expire in 2026, allowing
for a new set of operating guidelines to be put in place. By setting an expiration date, the DOI
has institutionalized flexibility in their drought response, so problems discovered by monitoring
the effectiveness of past policies can be addressed through updated operating guidelines. This
displays the flexibility necessary for a governance structure to adapt to the unpredictable
challenges that arise when managing drought.
An adaptive governance framework also emphasizes the role of SHs and recommends
them to be included across the entire policy process. Including the perspective of SHs in crafting
the SH engagement process builds trust between SHs, and between SHs and the State (Smyth et
al, 2020; Wehn et al, 2018). Arizona has taken steps to move away from a technocratic approach
to water governance. The Steering Committee and ARC display a departure from the top-down
process that resulted in 2007 Interim Guidelines, in which indigenous SH were completely
excluded.
However, both the participatory structure of the Steering Committee and ARC are limited
by many of the issues identified by critiques of IWRM. These include a lack of recognition of
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power imbalances between SH and the variety of barriers that can contribute to the exclusion of
marginalized groups from participating SH meetings (Saravanan et al, 2009; Butler &
Adamowski, 2015). Participatory processes under an AG framework encourages the role of the
SH, not only in the process of policy drafting and revision, but also in the design of the SH
process itself and the knowledge production being performed by the state.
These challenges identified in the literature reflect the structure of SH engagement in
Arizona. In 2016, the Steering Committee was presented with a draft of the DCP already created
by the basin states and the DOI, and were not consulted on the structure of the Steering
Committee itself. The experience of participating in the Steering Committee resulted in SHs
having little trust in the participatory process and feeling their perspective was not valued by the
state. This sentiment was expressed by tribal leaders, who felt they’re schedules were not taken
into account when the ADWR was setting up Steering Committee meetings and their input did
not have a significant impact on the final policy.
The SH engagement process in Arizona also failed to accommodate the needs of
marginalized SHs and facilitate their participation. In addition to not acknowledging the time
constraints of tribal representatives, the Steering Committee required participants to commute
from remote reservation to Phoenix for meetings. Although participants are able to participate
virtually in the Steering Committee and ARC, limited internet access or not having the necessary
technology can still limit the participation of low income SHs.
The second round of SH engagement in Arizona, ARC, has made some efforts to address
the challenges present to marginalized groups in the Steering Committee. The addition of a
modeling and analysis group (MAWG) demonstrated the state's effort to further engage SHs in
drought modeling and expand their understanding of the issues facing the Colorado River.
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ADWR also invited another member to represent tribal interests on ARC, displaying an attempt
to expand indigenous representation on the committee. These steps demonstrate growth, but
ARC still fails to address the scheduling conflicts and the barriers to internet access present in
previous stakeholder engagement initiatives.
The case of Arizona also demonstrates that the state is motivated to create participatory
venues when it sees the transactional value of including SHs. The Gila River Indian Community
and the Colorado River Tribes were belatedly added to the Steering Committee when the ADWR
saw the DCP negotiations would fail without their support. Since these two tribes were able to
commit to leaving 50,000 acre-feet of water in Lake Mead for three years, Arizona was able to
meet its commitments under the proposed DCP guidelines. Only after recognizing how Arizona
would benefit from including tribal representatives did the state make the effort to include them
on the Steering Committee. One benefit to this transactional lens, is that it is likely that the state
will continue to open up drought discussions to tribal members in the future since tribal nations
in Arizona have the highest priority water rights in the state, and have claims to a significant
amount of water from the Colorado River. Deals such as the one struck between Arizona and
these two tribes allow Arizona to meet its commitment to interstate agreements, while buffering
the impacts of water cuts on farmers and other SHs.
A clear policy window is currently open for increasing the adaptive structures of
governance in Arizona and the Colorado River Basin as a whole. Sudden and potentially harmful
occurrences act as focusing events that draw the attention of the public and policy makers to
pressing issues (Birkland, 1997). These events play a pivotal role in motivating change in the
Colorado River basin, with extreme drought conditions and Lake Mead’s near deadpool levels
prompting discussion between states and SHs within the Colorado River basin to create
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solutions. Focusing events have coupled with other crises, such as COVID, and with social
movements, such as BLM, causing the public and policymakers to view water access from an
environmental justice lens. The federal government has passed targeted legislation as a result of
this shift, helping to provide much needed funding to expand access to water on reservations.
This demonstrates the role focusing events and social movements have in bridging the three
streams described by Kingdon (1984) to create policy change, and in reframing problems to
influence the formation of new policies.
The window of opportunity remains open in Arizona and the Colorado River basin. The
recent tier 1 shortage declared by the Bureau of Reclamation in 2021 has affirmed the state's
fears of facing the consequences of drought. The two drought plans operating, the 2007 Interim
Guidelines and the 2019 DCP, are set to expire in 2026. With this deadline looming, a new
system for governing the Colorado River must be agreed upon by the basin states and the DOI.
With COVID and BLM spotlighting the inequalities present in the current water governance
regime, the federal and state government is faced with pressure to both create operating
guidelines that continue to provide funding for expanding water access on reservations and to
design a governance structure that includes indigenous voices. Policy entrepreneurs have
proposals ready to match with the pressing problems facing the state. For example, the Sovereign
Review Board proposed by Daryl Vigil would provide a new framework for governing the
Colorado River that expands tribal sovereignty by recognizing tribal nations as equal to the seven
basin states. Existing problems, targeted policy solutions for these problems, and the building
pressure on policy makers to enact change have created the potential for expanding adaptive and
inclusive governance in the Colorado River basin.
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The case of Arizona as a state engaged in the ongoing process of adapting to persistent
drought in the Colorado River basin demonstrates the ability of governance structures to rapidly
change as a result of the right political environment. Drought will remain a persistent problem in
the basin as a result of climate change, and governance structures will continue to change in
response to the unpredictable hydrology of the future. Arizona has continued to disappoint
indigenous SHs who have been historically excluded from discussions surrounding water
governance. Significant barriers remain that block their full engagement in the SH process.
However, pressure from tribal communities and environmental justice movements have allowed
a few tribes a seat at the table. As the governance of the Colorado River basin continues to
change and adapt to drought, the opportunity remains for the state to learn from previous failures
to engage indigenous SH and to create venues of participation that recognize and expand
indigenous sovereignty.
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Appendix i: List of Full Participants on the Steering Committee
Delegates, Affiliation, (Alternante)
Co-Chairs
Tom Buschatzke, Arizona Department of Water Resources, (Clint Chandler)
Ted Cooke, Central Arizona Project, (Suzanne Ticknor)
Municipal
Kathryn Sorensen, City of Phoenix Water, (Cynthia Campbell)
Timothy Thomure, City of Tucson Water, (Andrew Greenhil)l
Brian Biesemeyer, City of Scottsdale Water, (Kathy Rall)
Javier Setovich, City of Goodyear Public Works, (Dan Cotterman)
Joe Gysel, EPCOR Water US, (Troy Day)
William Garfield, Arizona Water Company, (Fred Schneider)
Joseph Olsen, Metropolitan Domestic Water Improvement District, (Wally Wilson)
Lois Wakimoto, Mohave County, (Jamie Kelley)
Agriculture Paul Orme, Pinal County Agriculture, (Dan Jones)
Wade Noble, Yuma Agriculture, (Meghan Scott)
Shane Leonard, Maricopa County Agriculture/Roosevelt Water Conservation District, (Richard
Strader)
Jay Whetten, Arizona Cattlemen’s Association, (David Brown)
Agriculture
Stefanie Smallhouse, Arizona Farm Bureau, (Chelsea McGuire)
Brian Wong, Pima County Agriculture/ Southern Arizona Water Users Association, (John
Kmiec)
Home Builders/Development
Spencer Kamps, Home Builders Association of Central Arizona, (Rob Anderson)
David Godlewski, Southern Arizona Home Builders Association, (Dennis Rule)
Cheryl Lombard, Valley Partnership, (John Graham)
Ted Maxwell, Southern Arizona Leadership Council, (Kip Volpe)
Glenn Hamer, Arizona Chamber of Commerce, (Courtney McKinstry)
Tribes
Chairman Dennis Patch, Colorado River Indian Tribes Vice Chairman, (Keith Moses)
Chairman Edward Manuel, Tohono O’odham Nation, (-)
Gov. Stephen Roe Lewis, Gila River Indian Community, (-)
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Industrial
Sandra Fabritz, Freeport-McMoRan, (Richard Bark)
NGO
Ted Kowalski, Walton Family Foundation, (Kevin Moran)
Miscellaneous
David Roberts, Salt River Project, (Chuck Podolak)
Virginia O’Connell, Arizona Water Banking Authority, (Terri Sue Rossi)
Laura Grignano, Central Arizona Groundwater Replenishment District, (Perri Benemelis)
Legislative Leadership
Sen. Gail Griffin, Arizona State Senate, Legislative District #14 Jeff Kros
Sen. Lisa Otondo, Arizona State Senate, Legislative District #4 Sen. Andrea Dalessandro
Rep. Rusty Bowers, Arizona House of Representatives, Legislative District #25, (Rep. David
Cook)
Rep. Rosanna Gabaldon, Arizona State House of Representatives, Legislative District #2,
(Andrew Loucks)
Central Arizona Project Board Champions
Lisa Atkins, Board President, Central Arizona Water Conservation District, (Jim Holway, Vice
President)
Karen Cesare, Central Arizona Water Conservation District Pima County, (Mark Taylor)
Governor’s Office
Kirk Adams, Governor’s Office, (-)
Hunter Moore, Governor’s Office, (-)
United States Bureau of Reclamation
Leslie Meyers, US Bureau of Reclamation, (Lisa Lance)

63
Appendix ii: Arizona Reconsultation Committee (ARC) members
Delegates, Affiliation, (Alternante)
Co-Chairs
Tom Buschatzke, Arizona Department of Water Resources, (Clint Chandler)
Ted Cooke, Central Arizona Project, (Patrick Dent)
Municipal
Cynthia Campbell, City of Phoenix Water Services
Timothy Thomure, City of Tucson Water, (Andrew Greenhill)
Brian Biesemeyer, City of Scottsdale Water, (Gretchen Baumgardner)
Javier Setovich, City of Goodyear Public Works, (Gretchen Erwin)
Joe Gysel, EPCOR Water US, (Troy Day)
William (Bill) Garfield, Arizona Water Company, (Fred Schneider)
Joseph (Joe) Olsen, Metropolitan Domestic Water Improvement District, (Wally Wilson)
Agriculture
Paul Orme, Pinal County Agriculture, (Dan Jones)
Wade Noble, Yuma County Agriculture, (Meghan Scott)
Shane Leonard, Phoenix AMA Agriculture, (Richard Strader)
Billy Elkins, Arizona Cattlemen’s Association, (David Brown)
Stefanie Smallhouse, Arizona Farm Bureau, (Chelsea McGuire)
Brian Wong, Pima County Agriculture - SAWUA
Homebuilders/ Development
Spencer Kamps, Home Builders Association of Central Arizona, (Rob Anderson)
David Godlewski, Southern Arizona Home Builders Association, (Dennis Rule)
Cheryl Lombard, Valley Partnership, (John Graham)
Ted Maxwell, Southern Arizona Leadership Council, (Kip Volpe)
Vacant, AZ Chamber of Commerce & Industry, (Courtney Coolidge)
Tribes
Chairwoman Amelia Flores, Colorado River Indian Tribes, (Keith Moses)
Chairman Ned Norris Jr., Tohono O’odham Nation, (-)
Governor Stephen Roe Lewis, Gila River Indian Community, (Jason Hauter)
Chairman Jamie Kelly, Mohave County, (-)
Industrial
Sandra (Sandy) Fabritz, Freeport-McMoRan, (Richard Bark)
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NGO
Kevin Moran, Walton Family Foundation, (Ted Kowalski)
Miscellaneous
David (Dave) Roberts, Salt River Project, (Colette Moore)
Virginia O’Connell, Arizona Water Banking Authority, (Simone Kjolsrud)
Laura Grignano, Central Arizona Groundwater Replenishment District, (-)
Legislative Leadership
Sen. Lisa Otondo, AZ State Senate Legislative District #4, (Sen. Andrea Dalessandro)
Sen. Sine Kerr, AZ State Senate Legislative District #13,
Rep. Gail Griffin AZ State Senate Legislative District #14, (Rep. Rusty Bowers)
Rep. Reginald Bolding, AZ State House of Representatives, LD #27
Central Arizona Project Board Champions
Terry Goddard, CAWCD Board President, (Mark Taylor)
Jim Holway, CAWCD Board, (Jennifer Brown)
Office of the Governor
Chuck Podolak, Office of the Governor
United States Bureau of Reclamation
Leslie Meyers, United States Bureau of Reclamation, (Lisa Lance)

